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Abstract 
 
In this paper the educational backgrounds of the Highest Paid Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in 
the United States are examined.  Specifically, the extent to which the specific degree earned affects 
the salary received and other variables are examined.  The data for the study is the Forbes 800 
CEO compensation data.  The time period for this study is the thirteen years from 1987-1999.  The 
results indicate that the total compensation that individuals earn as the CEO of the firm depends 
upon the undergraduate and graduate degree that the individual earns. Those with differing de-
grees are found to have been with the firm for a differing number of years, earned their undergra-
duate and graduate degrees at different ages, started working for the firm at different ages, be-
came the CEO at differing ages, and were with the firm for differing number of years prior to be-
coming the CEO. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
ach year since 1973, Forbes magazine has published a list containing information about the Chief Ex-
ecutive Officers (CEOs) of large United States Companies.  Specifically, Forbes Magazine examines 
compensation for approximately 800 Chief Executive Officers each year.  The 800 CEOs included in 
the list each year are identified from the Forbes 500 lists of largest companies ranked by sales, profits, assets and 
stock market value.  A company that makes any of the Forbes 500 lists is included in the Forbes 800 Compensation 
List.  This Forbes 800 Compensation List contains background information about each firm’s CEO, the compensa-
tion of the CEO, as well as firm performance data for the firm.  This Forbes 800 Compensation List is the founda-
tion for this study.    Specifically, in this study, the age of CEOs, the type of degrees the CEOs have earned and the 
compensation of CEOs are examined. 
 
Two competing theories of the relationship between education and future earnings are frequently for-
warded.  The human capital theory is that the credential of having a degree is not what is important in determining 
future successes.  Rather, the skills learned allow individual to achieve higher employment status.  The screening 
theory argues that credentials afford the individual something above and beyond the skills attained.  That is, individ-
uals can only realize the value of the skills they have learned when accompanied by the acquisition of a recognized 
credential.  Employers, lacking complete information about an individual, rely on credentials as a screening device.  
Students select an educational level that signals their abilities to employers.  This debate has continued for many 
years.  The general method used to distinguish between screening and human capital theories is to decompose the 
role of education into a skills component and an information component.  Studies typically do this by including both 
degrees earned and number of years of education variables into earnings regressions.  (Park, 1999, Gullason, 1999 
and Heywood, 1994).  Park (1999) estimated the certification value of different levels of education achievement.  
An earnings gain of 21 percent was found for obtaining a bachelor’s degree.  Heywood (1994) examined differences 
in signaling effects across public, private unionized, and non-unionized, labor markets.  He found that signaling ef-
fects are strongest in private sector and nonunion labor markets.  Gullason (1999) examines signaling effects across 
E 
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five age cohorts.  He finds that the returns to educational signals have reduced value as additional work experience 
permits a more direct observation of employee quality. 
 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992), established that CEO demographic attributes, such as youth, tenure, educa-
tional level, and functional background, affect firm performance and the firm’s strategic business decisions.  A study 
by Stevens, Beyer & Trice (1978) indicates that younger, or less mature CEOs are more innovative, seek more risk 
and seek more growth relative to their older, more seasoned counterparts.  Confirming these findings, a study con-
ducted by   
 
Thomas and Peyrefitte (1996) conducted a study of multinational firms that are based in the U.S.  They ex-
amined the electronics and computer industries and chemical and petroleum industries.   They hypothesize that the 
performance of multinational firms is a function of environmental, organizational, and leadership factors.  The lea-
dership traits that were identified included age, tenure with the company, position tenure, and education.  Their find-
ings suggest that older CEOs have a positive impact on firm performance, regardless of industry, when compared 
with their younger counterparts. They also find evidence to suggest that position tenure is negatively related to firm 
performance. They argue that this may be indicative that senior CEOs are resistant to positive change.   
 
Berry, Bisjak, Lemmon, and Naveen  (2000) examine the Forbes 1991 annual compensation survey aug-
mented with accounting data in a study of CEO turnover and firm diversification.  Their results indicate that the av-
erage CEO age varies from 56.2 and 57.3. Lucier, Schuyt, and Spiegel (2003), find that CEO average age when 
promote to the CEO position is 50 years of age. They also find that average CEO’s tenure has decrease by 2.2 years 
between 1995 to 2001.  Palia and Ravid (2002) use CEO compensation data covering the periods of 1981-1993.  
They find that on average CEO stay in office for 8.76 years.  They find that the average CEO age is 57.5 years.  
Moreover, 27% of the CEOs attended a top-ranked school.  Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) compile data using 
Forbes annual executive compensation reports and develop a study of these firms and their CEOs between 1971 and 
1990. They found that CEOs tend to leave their appointment at ages 64 and 65.  
 
Kato and Rockel (1992) completed a comparative study of 1000 large, Japanese versus U.S. firms.  They 
find that 60 percent of the Japanese CEOs had 15 or more years of experience with the firm prior to being appointed 
as the CEO, compared to 50 percent of the CEOs of U.S. firms.  Both Japanese and U.S. CEOs join the firm on av-
erage at age 29.  However, the Japanese averaged becoming the CEO at a later date.  Specifically, the Japanese CEO 
accepted the CEO position at age 56, while the U.S. CEO accepted the CEO position at age 49.  Japanese CEOs 
were found to work for the firm 27 years, while U.S. CEOs were found to work for the firm for 20 years.   Kato and 
Rockel (1992) also observe that 95 percent of Japanese CEOs and 97 percent of US CEOs had a college degree. 
However, while nearly 30% of the Japanese CEOs attended the University of Tokyo with preferred majors of Eco-
nomics and Business, only 10% of the US CEOs attended Harvard, with a smaller proportion majoring in business 
and economics.    
 
Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) provide an analysis of the compensation and educational background of the 
CEOs of major corporations.  They use the Forbes Compensation Survey data spanning a ten year period and includ-
ing 8,000 observations.  They examine the university where the individual earned his degree.  They find that there 
are preferred educational backgrounds for selection as the CEO of a major corporation.  They also examine how the 
educational background of the CEO is related to the CEO’s total compensation after controlling for industry, firm 
size and other mitigating factors.  The evidence indicates that those CEOs that do not have a degree earn significant-
ly more than those CEOs that do have a college degree.  They find little evidence that the school attended affects the 
compensation that the CEO receives.  They find that the age of the CEO as well as the number of years that the indi-
vidual has been the CEO have a positive impact on the compensation of the CEO.  They find that the number of 
years that the individual has been with the firm is negatively related to the compensation that the CEO earns.  They 
argue that this finding suggests that salary compression that is well known in academics also occurs in the highest 
levels of the corporate world.  Finally, they examine firm ROA and Tobin’s Q based on the educational background 
of the CEO.  They find an association between possession of a degree as well as where the degree was earned and 
the ROA and Tobin’s Q of the firm.   
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Brick, Palmon and Wald (2003) use a data sample form COMPUSTAT and Execump.  The data covers the 
period from 1992 to 1999.  They examine CEO compensation as it related to skill and risk preferences as well well-
document determinants such as CEO’s compensation sensitivity to firm performance, CEO age, gender and expe-
rience.  They find that age is not significantly related to CEO compensation.  Finally, the find evidence to indicate 
that experience is positively related to compensation. 
 
Hecker (1995) conducted a study based on the National Science Foundation (NFS) survey and 1990 census 
data.  He examines the earnings differences among fields of study. The study included 215,000 people, across 31 
fields of study and 34 occupations.   He finds that, regardless of age and gender, in general there is a relationship 
between field of study and future earnings. He finds that people with a degree in most liberal art fields earn less than 
people with degrees in engineering, and economics.  He also finds that Masters Degrees in Business are the top-
ranked field regardless of gender or age.  He also suggests that besides the field of study, other elements such as the 
amount of surplus personnel in a degree area, employer’s perception of the rigorousness of the field, college at-
tended, geographic location, and additional skill of the graduate may affect the individual’s total earnings. Finally, 
he argues that getting a degree may not be the key to success, rather he calls for more studies that address issues 
related to school attended as well as individual characteristics associated with job and career earnings.  
 
Mariani (1999) finds that individuals with a college degree earn a higher median income than that of indi-
vidual with less than a bachelor degree. His study also shows a relationship between age and earnings, suggesting 
that the highest earnings are achieved by people with ages between 35 and 54.  However, he also argues that indi-
vidual with less than a bachelor degree can command high earnings if they have the right skills, experience and 
work in a field with limited highly skilled workforce. 
 
In this paper we extend these lines of literature on several fronts.  We provide a detailed analysis of the 
types of degrees that those people who ultimately become the CEOs of major firms hold.  We examine the ages at 
which they earned both undergraduate and graduate degrees.  We examine when the CEO became employed by the 
firm and when they became the CEO of the firm, both in terms of age and relative to when they earned their degree.  
Finally, we examine total compensation as it is related to each of the above issues.  As such, the paper provides a 
substantial extension of several streams of literature. 
 
2.  Data 
 
Data from 1992-1999 were obtained from Forbes Magazine.  Data prior to 1992 was no longer available 
from Forbes Magazine.  In order to complete the dataset the Forbes 800 Compensation List was recreated in elec-
tronic format from hard copies of the magazine for years prior to 1992 and after 1997.  The combined dataset con-
tains 23,284 annual observations spanning from 1972 through 1999 (published in years 1973-2000).  The data con-
tained in the dataset varies by year.  Individual years contain as many as 30 variables.  Since the 1988 publication, 
Forbes has included variables in their dataset indicating the University where the CEO received his/her undergra-
duate and graduate degrees.  Of interest in this study is to examine these education variables.  As such Forbes data 
covering the calendar years 1987 through 1999 are used in this study.  This data contains 10,400 annual observa-
tions.   
 
3.  Results 
 
We begin by analyzing the number of degrees earned.  The results are presented in Table 1.  In Panel A of 
Table 1, an analysis of the undergraduate degrees is presented.  In Panel B, the results of the graduate degree analy-
sis are reported.  The notation is as follows:  BA = Bachelor of Arts, BS = Bachelor of Science, BE = Bachelor of 
Engineering, BBA is a Bachelor of Business Administration.  BSBA is a Bachelor of Science in Business  
Administration, MBA = Master of Business Administration, MA is the Master of Arts, MS = Master of Science, MD 
= Medical Doctor and Ph.D. = Doctor of Philosophy.  All other notation is self explanatory. 
 
The data contained 10,131 observations where undergraduate degree data were reported.  The results indi-
cate that most CEOs have earned a bachelors degree.  From these 10,131 observations, 9,259 management years 
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were performed by individuals having an undergraduate degree.  872 management years were performed by individ-
uals that did not have an undergraduate degree.  The most popular undergraduate degree was the Bachelor of 
Science degree with 3982 observations followed closely by the Bachelor of Arts degree with 3570 observations.  
Interestingly those classified as having a Bachelor of Business Administration Degree or a Bachelor of Science in 
Business Administration account for only 701 management years.  This was somewhat less than anticipated.   
 
In Panel B, the results of the analysis on graduate degrees are reported.  From 10,400 observations, 10,381 
observations reported graduate degree data.  Of these 10,381 management years, 5,145 were performed by managers 
that did not have a graduate degree and 5,236 management years were performed by individuals that have a graduate 
degree.  Thus just over 50 percent of the observations were performed by an individual having a graduate degree.  
The most popular graduate degree to have is the MBA degree.  MBA’s are responsible for 52.3 percent of the man-
agement years completed by individuals having a graduate degree. 
 
We continue the analysis by examining the total compensation earned by individuals having various degree 
levels.  To complete this analysis, CEO compensation data is deflated using the Consumer Price Index to 1999 
equivalent dollars.  The analysis Begins by examining the undergraduate degrees.  The most interesting result is that 
those not reporting their degree are the highest paid CEOs averaging $4,128,633.  Also interesting is that those that 
do not have a degree earn more than those having an undergraduate degree.   This finding is consistent with those of 
Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002).  These findings extend the analysis of Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) in two ways.  
First, the analysis covers a longer period of time.  Second, by breaking down the results by type of undergraduate 
degree, it can be determined if these differences are concentrated among those with a certain degree.  This analysis 
allows us to say that those without an undergraduate degree earn more than those having an undergraduate degree, 
regardless of what the degree is!  Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) provide several explanations for this finding.  One 
explanation is the possibility that there is a preponderance of CEOs that are firm founders among the non-degree 
group.  This issue is explored later in a forthcoming paper.  A second potentially confounding factor is the possibili-
ty that CEOs who are family members of major shareholders are represented more heavily in the non-degreed group.  
Unfortunately, the data does not contain the necessary information to explore CEO family background.    
 
A Mann-Whitney test is performed to determine if the differences in compensation by degree are signifi-
cant.   The Mann Whitney test is selected because of the substantial difference between the mean and the medians of 
the observations.  These substantial differences indicate a non-normal distribution of earnings within the group.  
Specifically, it indicates skewness in the compensation data.  That is, there are outliers who are paid substantially 
more than would be expected if the data were from a normal distribution.  The results of the Mann-Whitney test 
indicate that those with a Bachelor of Arts degree or No Degree earn significantly more than those with other de-
grees.  Those with a Bachelor of Science or a Law degree earn significantly less than those with other degrees, a 
finding that is in stark contrast to those of Hecker (1995).  Those with a Bachelors Degree in Engineering, Bachelor 
of Business Administration, Bachelor of Science in Business Administration or those that do not hold a degree are 
not significantly different from each other. 
 
The most striking results are found among the compensation of CEOs having graduate degrees.  Specifical-
ly noteworthy is the compensation of CEOs that have a Medical Doctor Degree.  These CEOs earn a mean annual 
total compensation of $8,781,645.  This figure is just short of twice the total compensation of next highest paid 
CEOs.  Those CEOs having a Ph.D. are the second highest paid averaging $4,391,071.  
 
Again, a Mann-Whitney test is performed to identify if these differences are significant.  The test statistics 
indicate that MBA’s, Medical Doctors, Ph.D. and those holding a degree classified as other are found to earn more 
than those with other degrees.  Those with no graduate degree are found to earn less than others.  The substantial 
differences between the median and the mean should again be reiterated here.  Specifically, it should be noted that 
while those without a graduate degree earn more than others when considering the mean, the exact opposite is true 
when the median is analyzed. 
 
We continue by performing a pairwise Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to obtain additional information re-
garding the differences in total compensation at various degree levels.    Degree is the treatment and total compensa-
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tion as the response in the ANOVA analysis.  The analysis rejects the null hypothesis that the mean compensation 
by degree is equal for both the undergraduate analysis and the graduate analysis.  For the undergraduate sample the 
F-value is 2.33 with a p-value of 0.0302, rejecting the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level.  For the graduate sam-
ple, the F-value is 1.99 with a p-value of 0.044, again rejecting the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level.  
 
 
Table 1:  Degree Earned 
Panel A:  
Undergraduate Degree 
N N with  
Comp. Data 
Total Comp. 
(Mean) 
Total Comp. 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
MW Test 
BA 3570 3532 $3,644,476 $1,519,440 $13,202,634 -6.54*** 
BS 3982 3945 $2,986,281 $1,383,478 $12,206,531 2.76*** 
BE 810 798 $2,881,165 $1,423,612 $4,795,823 -0.34 
BBA or BSBA 701 693 $2,743,990 $1,369,755 $4,975,610 1.20 
Law 93 92 $1,433,585 $965,897 $1,430,992 4.96*** 
Other 103 101 $3,738,393 $1,328,440 $11,325,455 0.92 
No Degree 872 851 $3,981,192 $1,262,479 $10,944,826 -2.63*** 
Not Reported 269 260 $4,128,633 $1,291,914 $1,7143,080 1.62 
Total Observations 10,400 10,272 3,292,916 1,419,082 11,806,192  
Panel B:  
Graduate Degree 
N N with  
Comp. Data 
Total Comp. 
(Mean) 
Total Comp. 
(Median) 
Standard 
Deviation 
MW Test 
MBA 2738 2700 $3,246,657 $1,520,754 $7,156,209 -4.98*** 
MA 219 219 $2,413,911 $1,373,254 $3,546,258 0.94  
MS 549 546 $2,786,209 $1,510,030 $4,779,336 -1.17  
MSE 100 99 $3,165,489 $1,619,975 $4,939,029 -0.98  
MD 37 34 $8,781,645 $3,425,258 $24,095,333 -2.62**  
Law 972 956 $2,834,575 $1,341,017 $5,208,641 0.59  
Ph.D. 508 507 $4,391,071 $1,549,386 $11,676,545 -2.27**  
Other 113 113 $2,742,254 $1,772,253 $3,089,595 -1.88* 
No Graduate Degree 5145 5080 $3,369,873 $1,350,503 $15,102,075 6.09***  
Not Reported 19 19 $1,779,050 $1,296,569 $2,004,255 0.99  
Total 10,400 10,063 $3,292,916 1,419,082 $11,806,192  
 
 
Table 2:  Analysis Of Variance For Degrees Earned 
Panel A:  Undergrad. Degree 
 BA BS BE   BBA, BSE Law Other   
Ba         
BS 658,195**        
BE 763,311 105,116       
BBA, BSBA 900,486 242,291 137,174      
Law 2,210,891 1,552,696 1,447,579 1,310,405     
Other 93,917 752,112 857,228 994,403 2,304,808    
No Degree 336,716 994,912** 1,100,028 1,237,202** 2,547,607** 242,799   
Panel B:  Graduate Degree 
 MBA MA MS MSE MD Law Ph.D. Other 
MBA         
MA 832,746        
MS 460,449 372,297       
MSE 81,168 751,578 379,281      
MD 5,534,989** 6,367,735** 5,995,437** 5,616,157**     
Law 412,082 420,664 48,367 330,914 5,947,071**    
Ph.D. 1,144,414** 1,977,160** 1,604,863** 1,225,582 4,390,575** 1,556,496**   
Other 504,403 328,343 43,955 423,235 6,039,392** 92,321 1,648,817  
No  Degree 123,216 955,962 583,664 204,384 5,411,773** 535,298 1,021,198 627,619 
 
 
In order to identify the source of these differences, we tests for differences in means using Fisher’s Least 
Significant Difference Test.  The results are presented in Table 2.  The results indicate that most of the significant 
differences in the undergraduate sample occur between those without a degree and all others.  The one exception is 
between those with a BS versus those with a BA degree.  Those with a BS degree earn significantly more than those 
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with a BA degree.   More significant differences are found in the graduate sample.  Medical doctors earn significant-
ly more than those with any other degree. Those with Ph.D.’s earn significantly more than those with all other de-
grees with the exceptions of Medical Doctors and those with a Masters Degree in Engineering, and those with an 
unspecified degree.  It is interesting that those with advanced graduate degrees, a Ph.D. and a MD, earn more than 
the others. This evidence certainly suggests that the skills earned through an advanced graduate degree are valuable 
in the marketplace. 
 
The analysis continues by examining the average age of the CEO by the degree that they hold.  The results 
are presented in Table 3.  The first figure in each cell is the age while the number in parentheses indicates the num-
ber of observations.  The number in the second line of each cell is the test statistic for the Mann-Whitney test for 
difference in means.  Where * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level and *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level in the usual fashion.  The notation is as follows Age UG is 
the age at which the individual earned the undergraduate degree, Age Grad is the age at which the graduate degree 
was earned, Age Start is the age at which the individual started working for the company, AGE CEO is the age at 
which the individual became the CEO and Yrs Firm Prior is the number of years the individual was with the firm 
prior to becoming the CEO.  The evidence indicates that CEOs have similar ages regardless of the degree they hold, 
or weather they have a graduate degree.  The overall average age of the CEOs is 56.20 years.  The highest average is 
60.57 years and the lowest is 55.05 years old.  These findings are remarkably consistent with those of Berry Bisjak, 
Lemmon and Naveen (2002). 
 
The analysis continues by examining the number of years the CEO has been with the firm.  The overall av-
erage number of years the CEO has been with the firm is 21.84, with a standard deviation of 12.56 years.   Next, we 
examine the mean number of years the individual has been with the firm based on the degree they hold.  It is ex-
pected that those CEOs having higher levels of education will be with the firm fewer years.  The additional time 
required to complete their education, reducing the number of years they have in the work force, as well as the num-
ber of years that they have been with their current firm.   As would be expected, those CEOs that do not have a de-
gree are with the firm longer than those CEOs that do have an undergraduate degree.  Those without a degree have 
been with the firm on average 25.29 years while the highest average for those with a reported degree is 23.76.  The 
evidence clearly suggests that CEOs that have a graduate degree are with the firm less time than those CEOs that 
have a bachelor degree.  Those without a graduate degree have been with the firm 24.23 years on average, while 
those with a graduate degree have been with the firm for as little as 14 years.  Those with advanced graduate degrees 
(Ph.D. and Medical Degree’s) have the lowest averages at 16.52 and 13.87 years respectively. 
 
We continue by examining how old the CEO was when the individual earned his undergraduate degree.  
The results are presented in Column 4.  The overall average is 22.93 years old when the undergraduate degree is 
earned.  The most notable difference is that those with a Law degree earn their degree later than others.  Those with 
a BA degree, those with a BE degree and those that did not report their degree, earned their degrees at different 
times than the others.  Overall, the differences in age when the undergraduate degree is earned do not seem to be 
large, even in those cases where the difference is significant. 
 
Next, the age at which the individual earned their undergraduate degree, for each graduate degree is ex-
amined.  The results are in the fourth column in Panel B.  Interestingly, those without a graduate degree earn their 
undergraduate degree at a later age.  This may be an indicator that those not pursuing a graduate degree, spend addi-
tional time in their undergraduate program taking additional classes.  Alternatively, it may suggest that those that 
pursue a graduate degree are more motivated individuals, finishing their undergraduate work earlier.  
 
The analysis continues by examining the age of the CEO when he or she first became employed by the firm 
that they manage.  The results are presented in Column 5 of Table 3.  The overall mean age when the CEO began 
working for the firm that he/she manages is 34.36 years old, with a standard deviation of 11.31 years.   Comparing 
the time that the individual earned his/her undergraduate degree (22.93 years of age) to the time that the individual 
started working for the firm (34.36 years of age), we find that individuals spend 11.43 years on average in alterna-
tive roles prior to starting work for the company that they will ultimately become the CEO of.  Those with a BA 
degree, law undergraduate degree and those that did not report their degree, started with the firm at a later date than 
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the others.  Those with a degree classified as “other”, started with the firm earlier.  The difference between the min-
imum age and the maximum age is not trivial.  Those with a degree classified as other, started with the firm at 31.96 
years of age, while those that did not report their degree started at the age of 35.75 years.  The difference of 3.79 
years is substantial.   
 
Examining the age when the individual started working for the firm for each graduate degree is revealing.  
The results are presented in Column 6 of panel B.  The results indicate that those with a MA degree, a MD degree, a 
Ph.D. degree, and those that did not report their graduate degree started working for the firm later than others.  This 
result is not surprising for the MD and PH.D. However, it is somewhat surprising for those with an MA degree and 
those not reporting their degree.  Most interestingly, those that did not report their graduate degree, started working 
for the firm substantially later than others at 45 years of age.  Those without a graduate degree started working for 
the firm at a younger age than those with a graduate degree as would be expected. 
 
 
Table 3:  CEO Age By Degree Earned 
Panel A:   
Undergrad Degree 
Mean Age Years Firm Age UG Age Grad Age Start Age CEO Yrs Firm 
Prior 
BA 55.66(3570) 
5.42*** 
21.01 (3568) 
5. 05*** 
22.69 (3528) 
7.49***  
26.91 (2150) 
5.61*** 
34.67 (3568) 
-3.36*** 
47.81 (3570) 
3.94*** 
13.14 (3568) 
-2.05** 
BS 56.17(3982) 
0.56  
21.94 (3982) 
-0.92 
22.93 (3955) 
0.11  
27.65 (2025) 
-3.83*** 
34.23 (3982) 
0.94  
48.22 (3982) 
-0.44 
13.99 (3982) 
-1.85* 
B of Engineering 56.61(810) 
-2.81*** 
21.48 (810) 
0.44 
23.08 (796) 
-4.03*** 
28.01 (495) 
-4.46*** 
35.13 (810) 
-1.07  
51.20 (810) 
-13.46***  
16.07 (810) 
-4.00*** 
BBA or BSBA 55.30(701) 
4.53***  
21.66 (701) 
0.78 
23.49 (691) 
3.30 *** 
27.55 (327) 
1.65*  
33.64 (701) 
1.35  
46.72 (701) 
5.00***  
13.08 (701) 
0.97 
Law 60.57(93) 
-7.42*** 
23.76 (93) 
-1.77*  
24.74 (93) 
-10.81***  
25.94 (31) 
2.09*  
36.80 (93) 
-2.18* 
51.42 (93) 
5.23*** 
14.61(93) 
-0.78  
Other 57.04(103) 
2.77***  
25.08 (103) 
-2.85***  
23.83 (99) 
-1.28 
34.57 (42) 
-0.91 
31.96 (103) 
2.28* 
48.40 (103) 
-0.66 
16.44 (103)  
-2.10** 
No UG Degree 58.47(871) 
-7.61*** 
25.29 (871) 
-7.26*** 
N/A (872) 
N/A 
N/A (872) 
N/A 
33.18 (871) 
4.93 *** 
46.37 (871) 
3.45*** 
13.19 (871) 
2.68***  
Not Reported 55.73(269) 
0.04 
19.96 (268) 
2.08**  
23.42 (187) 
-3.33*** 
27.11 (106) 
0.67  
35.75 (268) 
-2.05* 
47.86 (269) 
0.82  
12.10 (268) 
2.60***  
Total Observations 56.20(10399) 21.84  
(10,396) 
22.93  
(10,221) 
  27.41        
(6048) 
 34.36 
(10396) 
48.08             
(10,399) 
  13.71 
(10,396) 
Panel B:   
Graduate Degree 
MEAN AGE Years Firm Age UG Age Grad AGE Start Age CEO Yrs Firm 
Prior 
MBA 54.67(2738) 
14.44***  
19.69(2738) 
11.18*** 
22.74 (2687) 
8.27***  
27.49 (2700) 
-1.47 
34.97 (2738) 
-5.78*** 
47.71 (2738) 
5.26 *** 
12.74 (2738) 
3.80*** 
MA 55.93(219) 
0.51  
16.90(219) 
5.87***  
21.97 (218) 
5.86***  
25.72 (218) 
6.87*** 
39.03 (219 ) 
-6.30***  
47.99 (219) 
1.17  
8.95 (219) 
6.77*** 
MS 55.41(549) 
3.42*** 
21.16(549) 
1.67 * 
22.43 (532) 
6.80*** 
27.18 (541) 
5.18*** 
34.25 (549) 
0.65  
47.87 (549) 
0.46  
13.62 (549) 
-0.19 
MSE 57.88(100) 
-2.98***  
23.38(100) 
1.09  
22.63 (100) 
0.53 
25.70 (100) 
3.54***  
34.50 (100) 
0.29  
51.74 (100) 
-5.51***  
17.24 (100) 
-1.59 
MD 57.46(37) 
0.58  
13.87(37) 
5.20*** 
22.19 (37) 
2.64** 
25.94 (37) 
1.88*  
43.59 (37) 
-9.16*** 
49.81 (37) 
-1.20  
6.22 (37) 
4.90*** 
Law 56.56(972) 
-2.36**  
19.84(971) 
5.93*** 
22.57 (962) 
5.24*** 
26.94 (965) 
0.96  
36.73 (971) 
-11.30*** 
48.56 (972) 
-1.09  
11.84 (971) 
4.86*** 
Ph.D. 55.05(508) 
4.73*** 
16.52(508) 
10.82***  
22.42 (469) 
5.43*** 
28.83 (489) 
10.96***  
38.53 (508) 
-11.33*** 
48.12 (508) 
0.43  
9.59 (508) 
8.81*** 
Other 56.78(113) 
-1.47  
20.97(113) 
0.64 
22.72 (112) 
0.97  
29.16 (112) 
-4.54*** 
35.80 (113) 
-1.47  
51.07 (113) 
-6.02***  
15.27 (113) 
1.21 
No Graduate Degree 57.11(5145) 
-13.82***  
24.23(5142) 
-19.93***  
23.33 (4196) 
-18.73***  
N/A (5145) 
119.81*** 
32.87 (5142) 
16.90*** 
48.03 (5142) 
-2.29**  
15.16 (5142) 
-10.73*** 
Not Reported 56.05(19) 
0.35  
15.89 (19) 
1.67  
23.12 (16) 
0.09  
31.55 (11) 
-5.88***  
45 (19) 
-1.19 
51.68 (19) 
-1.70 
11.53 (19) 
1.00 
Total 56.20        
(10,399) 
21.84 
(10,396) 
22.93       
(10,396) 
27.41 
(10,318) 
34.36    
(10,396) 
48.08       
(10,397) 
13.71       
(10,396) 
Next, the age of the individual when they became the CEO of the firm is examined.  The results are pre-
sented in Column 6.  The average age of the individuals when they became CEO is 48.08 with a standard deviation 
of 8.15.  The Undergraduate degree results indicate that CEOs without an undergraduate degree and those with a 
business degree become the CEO of a major firm at the earliest age.  Those with a law or engineering degree be-
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come the CEO later.  Individuals with a Business undergraduate degree become the CEO nearly 5 years earlier than 
those with Engineering or Law degrees.   
 
The analysis continues by examining how many years the individuals have been employed by the firm prior 
to becoming the CEO of the firm.  The results are presented in Column 7.  The overall average is 13.71 years with a 
standard deviation of 11.88.  The averages by undergraduate degree vary between 12.10 years and 16.44 years.  
Those with a degree classified as other work with the firm the longest prior to becoming the CEO while those that 
did not report their degree are with the firm the shortest amount of time prior to becoming the CEO. 
 
An analysis of how many years the individual has been with the firm for each graduate degree is presented 
in Column 7 of Panel B.  The results indicate that those with an MD degree are with the firm only 6.22 years prior to 
becoming the CEO of the firm.  Those without a graduate degree are with the firm 15.16 years prior to becoming the 
CEO of the firm.  The difference of 8.94 clearly suggests that there is a fast track for those individuals that have 
hither level degrees. 
 
The analysis continues by performing several regression analyses by regressing the age, founder and degree 
earned variables on the Total Compensation of the CEO.  The results are presented in Table 4.  The results indicate 
that Founders earn more than other CEOs.  There is a $97,847 salary increase for each year the CEO serves in that 
capacity an amount that is higher than those figures found in Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert.  Those without an undergra-
duate degree earn more than those that do have an undergraduate degree.  The age of the CEO, as well as having a 
graduate degree are not important in explaining the compensation of the CEO.  While no relationship is found in the 
single regression, a negative relationship between the years with the firm and the compensation of the CEO in the 
multiple regression is found.  This finding suggests some degree of salary compression in the highest ranks of t he 
corporate world that is similar to that is well known in the educational arena.   
 
 
Table 4: Regressions On Total Compensation. 
Constant CEOAGE YRFRM YRCEO UGATT GATT R2/Fstat 
2,064,680 
10,271 
21,842 
1.30 
    0.0002 
1.70 
2,994,548 
10,271 
     0.007 
66.88*** 
3,559,910 
10,268 
 -12,170 
-1.30 
   0.0002 
1.70 
2,489,404 
10,271 
  97,847 
6.78*** 
  0.005 
46.03*** 
3,976,855 
10,257 
   -748,962 
-1.78* 
 0.0003 
3.15* 
3,369,596 
10,267 
    -150,393 
-0.65 
0.0000 
0.42 
3,878,431  
10,254  
-5508  
-0.28  
-43,110  
-3.99*** 
124,225  
7.50*** 
-381,924  
-0.9  
 0.0063 
16.38*** 
3,608,359  
10,265  
-5562 
-0.28  
-44,057  
-405*** 
125,814  
7.65*** 
 -131,162  
-0.55  
0.0063  
16.33*** 
3,902,563  
3.52  
-5671  
-0.29  
-43,696  
4.01***  
124,254  
7.5***  
-339,468 
-0.76  
-80,109  
-0.32  
0.0064  
13.12*** 
 
 
We continue by replacing the undergraduate and graduate school attendance variables with dummy va-
riables indicating the degree earned.  Dummy variables are assigned to each degree in the following manner D1=1 if 
the degree is a bachelor of arts, 0 otherwise.  Similarly, a dummy variable is created for each degree.  We regress 
total compensation on each degree level, and then include control variables to mitigate the effects of several factors.  
The results are presented in Table 5.  The results indicate that those with a Bachelor of Science Degree earn signifi-
cantly less than those with other degrees, while those without a degree and those with a Bachelor of Arts degree earn 
more than all others.  The finding that those without an undergraduate degree earn more than others is consistent 
with the findings of Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002).  After incorporating the control variables, CEO AGE YRFRM, 
and YRCEO, the only remaining significant result is with regard to the CEOs that have a Bachelor of Arts degree.   
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Finally, we examine the starting age as the CEO as it relates to a number of variables.  The age at which the 
individual becomes the CEO of the firm is critical.  Given the compensation packages that these individuals earn, it 
is critical to know what variables might be related to how early in an individual is able to place himself/herself in 
this position.  The results are presented in Table 6.  The results indicate that those with an undergraduate degree be-
come the CEO at a later date than those without an undergraduate degree.  The year variable is included in the anal-
ysis to identify changes in the pattern of CEO start ages over time.  The insignificance of the variable indicates that 
the starting age for CEOs does not change significantly throughout the sample time period.  The age at which the 
individual received his undergraduate and graduate degree is positively related to the age at which the individual 
became the CEO.  That is, those that earn their undergraduate degree at a later age, also become the CEO of the firm 
at a later age.    
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Table 5:  Regression of variables on Total Compensation 
 
Constant BS BA BE BBA, BSE Other Law No Degree Not Report CEO 
AGE 
Yrfrm Yrceo R2/Fstat 
3,484,108 
(10,271) 
-497,827 
0.0001*** 
          0.0004 
4.23** 
3,108,685 
(10,271) 
 535791 
2.19** 
         0.0005 
4.77** 
3,327,598 
(10,271) 
  -446,433 
-1.03 
        0.0001 
1.05 
3,332,628 
(10,271) 
   -588,638 
-1.27 
       0.0002 
1.61 
3,288,492 
(10,271) 
    449,901 
0.38 
      0.000 
0.15 
3,309,719 
(10,271) 
     -1,876,134 
1.52 
     0.0002 
2.30 
3,230,744 
(10,271) 
      750,449 
1.78* 
    0.0003 
3.15* 
3,271,213 
(10,271) 
       857,420 
1.16 
   0.0001 
1.34 
3,669,105  
(10,268)  
-454,196  
-1.9  
       -5125  
-0.26  
-42,908  
-3.98*** 
125,423  
7.263*** 
0.0066  
17.16*** 
3,208,674 
(10,268)  
 533,112  
2.18** 
      -3544  
-0.18  
-42,547  
-3.94*** 
125,867  
7.66*** 
0.0068 
17.44***  
3,493,494 
(10,268)  
  -85,496  
-0.20  
     -4956  
-0.250  
-43,096  
-4.00***  
125,711  
7.60*** 
0.0063  
16.26*** 
3,603,409 
(10,268)  
   -662,267  
-1.43  
    -6419  
-0.33  
-43,028  
-3.99*** 
126,799  
7.71*** 
0.0065  
16.76*** 
3,495,477  
(10,268) 
    525,270  
0.45  
   -5206  
-0.27  
-43,235  
-4.01*** 
126,119  
7.67*** 
0.0063  
16.30*** 
3,414,771  
(10,268)  
     -1,912,816  
-1.55  
  -3292  
-0.17  
-43,325  
-4.02*** 
125,797  
7.66***  
0.0065 
16.85*** 
3,476,150  
(10,268)  
      133,039  
0.56  
 -5604  
-0.29  
-43,972 
-4.04*** 
125,791 
7.65***  
0.0063  
16.33*** 
3,466,167 
(10,268) 
       751,345 
1.01 
-5019 
-0.26 
-42,942 
-3.98*** 
125,943 
7.66*** 
0.0064 
16.51*** 
4,146,946  
(10,268)  
 1,013,411  
-1.34  
-384,369  
-0.51  
-817,722  
-0.97  
-1,347,081 
-1.57  
-215,398  
-0.16  
-2,627,179  
-1.84  
-384,832 
-0.46 
Omit -3536  
-0.18 
-42,714  
-3.96 *** 
123,900  
7.45***  
0.0074  
7.66 *** 
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Table 6:  Regression On Age At Which The Individual Became The CEO 
Constant UGATT Year ageug Yrfrm GATT gradage R2/Fstat 
46.33 
10,383 
1.907 
6.64*** 
     0.0042 
44.04*** 
51.07 
10,398 
 -0.0322 
-1.51 
    0.0002 
2.27 
40.07 
9348 
  0.3575 
12.03*** 
   0.0152 
144.7*** 
48.28 
10,395 
   -0.0093 
-1.47 
  0.0002 
2.15 
48.04 
10,395 
    0.0785 
0.49 
 0.0000 
0.24 
40.29  
5175  
     0.2864  
13.74***  
0.0352 
188.66***  
 
 
Table 7: Year Undergraduate Degree Was Earned 
Relative To The Year The CEO Started Working For The Firm. 
RY N CO CD MC MDC RY N CO CD MC MDC 
. 1027 1027 0.099981 4,499,517 1,338,874 13 179 6538 0.636488 3,013,122 1,133,402 
-27 8 1035 0.100759 940369.4 1164206 14 247 6785 0.660533 3683358 1598607 
-26 3 1038 0.101051 437354 435955 15 230 7015 0.682924 2911669 1452861 
-22 4 1042 0.101441 780467 804219 16 215 7230 0.703855 2948546 1501887 
-21 3 1045 0.101733 1472058 1560839 17 149 7379 0.718361 4776598 1781973 
-19 3 1048 0.102025 896226 891070 18 202 7581 0.738026 4123473 1625318 
-18 2 1050 0.10222 6154302 6154301 19 235 7816 0.760903 8476666 1596035 
-17 2 1052 0.102414 4368783 4368783 20 236 8052 0.783879 3776302 1695843 
-16 1 1053 0.102512 424091 424091 21 158 8210 0.79926 2315906 1009383 
-15 4 1057 0.102901 416173 408745 22 186 8396 0.817368 3772512 1537286 
-14 3 1060 0.103193 2307645 2055670 23 198 8594 0.836643 2930473 1612488 
-13 4 1064 0.103583 4290246 2958546 24 160 8754 0.85222 3161880 1489746 
-12 13 1077 0.104848 2407170 1231894 25 242 8996 0.875779 2135095 1203689 
-11 9 1086 0.105724 1421365 1563903 26 148 9144 0.890187 2447232 1387140 
-10 23 1109 0.107963 1884465 1527128 27 153 9297 0.905082 2332430 1288445 
-9 12 1121 0.109132 1349364 993678 28 149 9446 0.919587 3613706 1194337 
-8 28 1149 0.111857 5378314 1940924 29 180 9626 0.937111 3787249 1347554 
-7 38 1187 0.115557 2234230 1736531 30 128 9754 0.949572 6778472 1504394 
-6 35 1222 0.118964 2831667 1712783 31 116 9870 0.960864 2405404 1539898 
-5 30 1252 0.121885 1649935 1155388 32 96 9966 0.97021 3093164 1838671 
-4 19 1271 0.123734 3758297 3567460 33 47 10013 0.974786 4911375 2694868 
-3 20 1291 0.125681 1156043 839481 34 48 10061 0.979459 2354878 1618246 
-2 92 1383 0.134638 2558368 1514223 35 55 10116 0.984813 2452203 1529055 
-1 1026 2409 0.234521 2315905 1378477 36 36 10152 0.988318 2805963 2466060 
0 377 2786 0.271223 2739027 1467795 37 27 10179 0.990946 1587492 853759 
1 512 3298 0.321067 2416518 1520826 38 18 10197 0.992699 1209119 956557 
2 434 3732 0.363318 3447878 1370074 39 27 10224 0.995327 2802662 1541000 
3 417 4149 0.403914 2330255 1411119 40 11 10235 0.996398 1267875 583584 
4 316 4465 0.434677 2898757 1467639 41 3 10238 0.99669 1548928 1577248 
5 366 4831 0.470308 2246133 1211048 42 5 10243 0.997177 3979225 2075897 
6 221 5052 0.491822 2886710 1399677 43 11 10254 0.998248 2899107 1856364 
7 258 5310 0.516939 3375097 1632084 44 7 10261 0.998929 1108897 975573 
8 253 5563 0.541569 5590819 1674882 46 1 10262 0.999026 942535 942536 
9 193 5756 0.560358 3267184 1171827 47 1 10263 0.999124 0 0 
10 243 5999 0.584015 3750682 1484658 48 3 10266 0.999416 2081857 793533 
11 143 6142 0.597936 2046313 1176989 49 3 10269 0.999708 382450 446617 
12 217 6359 0.619062 3047502 1355988 50 1 10270 0.999805 938499 938499 
      52 2 10272 1 3636423 3636423 
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We continue by providing a cumulative distribution presentation of the ages at which various significant 
events occur in the CEO’s life.  The analysis is done by examining for example, the year at which the undergraduate 
degree was earned relative to the year the individual became the CEO of the firm.  Relative year 0 in the tables indi-
cates that the CEO started working for the company in the same year as he received his undergraduate degree, -1 
indicates that the CEO started working for the firm one year before he/she received his undergraduate degree and    
+1 indicates that the CEO started working for the company one year after he received his undergraduate degree.  We 
also report the Mean and Median total compensation for those in each category.  The notation in the tables is as fol-
lows:  RY = Relative Year, N = Number of observation, CO = the Cumulative number of observation, CD = the 
Cumulative Distribution, MC = Mean Compensation, MDC = Median Compensation.  The results are presented in 
Table 6-9.   
 
In Table 7, the year that the undergraduate degree was earned relative to the year that the CEO started 
working for the firm is presented.    The first column is the relative year.  The most interesting result in this table is 
the preponderance of CEOs that started working for the firm that they would manage in the year prior to their gradu-
ation from college.  The data indicates that 1026 observations were performed by people who started working for the 
firm one year prior to their graduation.  An additional 356 observations were performed by people who started work-
ing for the firm sometime prior to the year before they earned their degree.  Several potential explanations can be 
forwarded with regard to this result.  First, those people who ultimately become CEOs might do so through some 
type of internship program, thus they become an employee of the firm prior to graduating from college.  A second 
explanation is that a large number of CEOs might be very near completing their degree when they take their jobs, 
finishing the final class or two of their degree while they are working for the firm.  A third explanation rests in limi-
tations of the data.  Unfortunately, while the Forbes data contains the age of the CEO, it does not provide the exact 
birth date.  Similarly, data regarding the date that the CEO began working for the firm is not available.  As several 
imprecise variables were combined to compute the relative year that the CEO began working for the company, the 
resulting errors could be compounded in this table.  As such, some caution must be exercised in interpreting the re-
sults.   
 
We continue by examining the year with the graduate degree was earned relative to the year that the indi-
vidual started with the firm.  The results are presented in Table 8.  Again, those figures with negative numbers indi-
cate that the individual started working for the firm 34 years prior to receiving his graduate degree.  6,510 individu-
als started working for the firm prior to earning their graduate degree.  Of those 6510, 5157 observations were per-
formed by individuals that never earned a degree.  Thus, 1353 observations were performed by an individual who 
earned his graduate degree after starting to work for the company. 
 
Next, we examine the year that the undergraduate degree was earned relative to the year that the individual 
became the CEO of the firm.  The results are presented in Table 9.  The results indicate from those CEOs that have a 
degree, only 25 observations were performed by an individual that earned his/her  undergraduate degree after be-
coming the CEO of the firm.  This is not particularly surprising given the demands of being the CEO of a major cor-
poration.  The time frame ranged from 14 years after becoming the CEO to 56 years before becoming the CEO of 
the firm. 
 
Finally, in Table 10, the year that the graduate degree was earned relative to the year that the individual be-
came the CEO of the firm is examined.  Again, the results indicate that few CEOs earn their degree after they be-
come the CEO of the firm.  Only 24 observations were performed by individuals that earned their graduate degree 
after taking on CEO responsibilities.  The figures ranged from 15 years after the individual became the CEO to 55 
years before the individual became the CEO of the firm. 
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Table 8: Year When Graduate Degree Was Earned 
Relative To Year The Individual Started With Firm 
RY N CO CD MC MDC  RY N CO CD MC MDC 
. 5157 5157 0.502044 3,376,792 1,348,431  7 96 7745 0.753991 3,929,267 1,640,389 
-34 3 5160 0.502336 437354.1 435955.3  8 124 7869 0.766063 2583576 1221211 
-30 8 5168 0.503115 1755628 1918517  9 155 8024 0.781153 3910028 1427988 
-29 4 5172 0.503505 915187.2 913599.6  10 114 8138 0.792251 4518227 1767443 
-28 6 5178 0.504089 2104915 2158370  11 61 8199 0.798189 3096573 1640756 
-27 1 5179 0.504186 936474.7 936474.7  12 153 8352 0.813084 4011270 2093087 
-26 7 5186 0.504868 1914149 1697000  13 201 8553 0.832652 3419052 1701766 
-25 1 5187 0.504965 4877250 4877250  14 149 8702 0.847157 4103650 1249260 
-22 6 5193 0.505549 722293.7 706021.1  15 140 8842 0.860787 5666608 1625743 
-21 1 5194 0.505646 1937143 1937143  16 113 8955 0.871787 2934979 1168255 
-20 2 5196 0.505841 2260070 2260070  17 124 9079 0.883859 2938288 1611525 
-19 25 5221 0.508275 1112933 815625.8  18 135 9214 0.897002 3744502 1659805 
-18 9 5230 0.509151 1096954 1054348  19 113 9327 0.908002 3794939 1454717 
-17 10 5240 0.510125 984697.6 1033025  20 128 9455 0.920463 3012547 1691992 
-16 16 5256 0.511682 1889889 1029756  21 72 9527 0.927473 2574147 1450424 
-15 13 5269 0.512948 2457447 2351101  22 101 9628 0.937305 2211642 1429993 
-14 18 5287 0.5147 1991703 1458003  23 77 9705 0.944801 2383792 1280000 
-13 18 5305 0.516452 1571073 1102656  24 100 9805 0.954537 2759105 1703998 
-12 28 5333 0.519178 9718741 2953488  25 93 9898 0.96359 5538595 2175365 
-11 24 5357 0.521515 6643723 1650584  26 73 9971 0.970697 2013247 1308445 
-10 41 5398 0.525506 1797185 831307.2  27 71 10042 0.977609 6674845 3371450 
-9 51 5449 0.530471 1835295 1294835  28 34 10076 0.980919 1976167 1728418 
-8 45 5494 0.534852 1201696 1054860  29 42 10118 0.985008 3805594 1790528 
-7 61 5555 0.54079 1923198 1099790  30 48 10166 0.989681 2621069 1916312 
-6 71 5626 0.547702 2002853 1429993  31 30 10196 0.992601 4001956 2783764 
-5 81 5707 0.555588 3135796 1906120  32 13 10209 0.993867 1386313 1251000 
-4 68 5775 0.562208 1884735 1170260  33 11 10220 0.994938 1665836 1604196 
-3 23 5798 0.564447 1681258 946470.8  34 5 10225 0.995424 730772.6 767808.5 
-2 59 5857 0.570191 2634224 1440029  35 18 10243 0.997177 1864375 1144682 
-1 653 6510 0.633762 3574935 1598227  36 10 10253 0.99815 1677856 1107020 
0 214 6724 0.654595 1803186 1308200  37 4 10257 0.99854 1253097 1359420 
1 212 6936 0.675234 2119457 1540791  38 0 10257 0.99854 . . 
2 127 7063 0.687597 4309443 1626560  39 1 10258 0.998637 0 0 
3 119 7182 0.699182 2605257 1677859  40 1 10259 0.998734 784963.6 784963.6 
4 183 7365 0.716998 3195720 1308000  41 1 10260 0.998832 0 0 
5 162 7527 0.732769 2545446 1474425  42 10 10270 0.999805 3211717 1885128 
6 122 7649 0.744646 2627292 1481032  49 2 10272 1 3636423 3636423 
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Table 9: Year Undergraduate Degree Was Earned  
Relative To The Year The Individual Became CEO Of The Firm. 
RY N CO CD MC MDC  RY N CO CD MC MDC 
. 1024 1024 0.099688 4,494,479 1,337,677  24 365 4780 0.465343 2,110,176 1,272,164 
-14 1 1025 0.099786 4231054 4231054  25 469 5249 0.511001 2272788 1398645 
-12 1 1026 0.099883 1231894 1231894  26 608 5857 0.570191 2936017 1548303 
-9 1 1027 0.099981 996953.3 996953.3  27 495 6352 0.61838 2705117 1332000 
-3 8 1035 0.100759 852313 857398.6  28 546 6898 0.671534 3286044 1487214 
-1 14 1049 0.102122 5648023 6264016  29 582 7480 0.728193 2638461 1316919 
0 15 1064 0.103583 5448886 1616024  30 472 7952 0.774143 3683391 1511487 
1 7 1071 0.104264 820328.5 1111158  31 409 8361 0.81396 2623978 1274811 
2 21 1092 0.106308 2453085 1566248  32 429 8790 0.855724 2464933 1400936 
3 38 1130 0.110008 2268991 2130960  33 287 9077 0.883664 2977441 1760000 
4 26 1156 0.112539 2367640 1286073  34 296 9373 0.912481 2167311 1562762 
5 35 1191 0.115946 2315468 1028536  35 228 9601 0.934677 2627275 1475918 
6 68 1259 0.122566 3055161 1146363  36 155 9756 0.949766 2683112 1408257 
7 39 1298 0.126363 5049364 1666818  37 147 9903 0.964077 2875130 1644251 
8 49 1347 0.131133 15960007 1850459  38 120 10023 0.975759 2813080 1636949 
9 69 1416 0.13785 6821803 2695260  39 87 10110 0.984229 3615288 1578611 
10 41 1457 0.141842 4449873 1895458  40 54 10164 0.989486 2085574 1105566 
11 89 1546 0.150506 1311675 792982.6  41 17 10181 0.991141 1369751 703562.7 
12 127 1673 0.16287 5904857 1915938  42 28 10209 0.993867 2427322 1743966 
13 81 1754 0.170755 2547050 1197692  43 18 10227 0.995619 4500153 1779260 
14 119 1873 0.18234 4306892 1482752  44 18 10245 0.997371 1377341 1447053 
15 123 1996 0.194315 2691708 1051463  45 1 10246 0.997469 296165.3 296165.3 
16 133 2129 0.207262 2699836 1177445  46 5 10251 0.997956 2024744 1064179 
17 256 2385 0.232185 2730865 1212296  47 1 10252 0.998053 0 0 
18 236 2621 0.25516 3619181 1362613  48 6 10258 0.998637 3566490 2902785 
19 321 2942 0.28641 5471969 1280638  49 4 10262 0.999026 832799.6 479272.1 
20 346 3288 0.320093 3355851 1413605  50 6 10268 0.999611 1233788 1257250 
21 371 3659 0.356211 2461569 1214648  51 0 10268 0.999611 . . 
22 367 4026 0.391939 3476376 1779805  52 2 10270 0.999805 3636423 3636423 
23 389 4415 0.429809 4831482 1592032  56 2 10272 1 1488725 1488725 
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Table 10: Year Graduate Degree Was Earned  
Relative To The Year The Individual Became CEO Of The Firm. 
RY N CO CD MC MDC RY N CO CD MC MDC 
. 5156 5156 0.501947 3,377,440 1,348,919 20 267 7605 0.740362 4,677,682 1,697,681 
-15 1 5157 0.502044 4877250 4877250 21 200 7805 0.759833 2695415 1214968 
-10 1 5158 0.502142 1074215 1074215 22 249 8054 0.784073 1889878 1174713 
-7 5 5163 0.502629 27985137 29937757 23 232 8286 0.806659 3400248 1972128 
-5 5 5168 0.503115 944931.3 896129.2 24 285 8571 0.834404 2848105 1581708 
-4 1 5169 0.503213 567919.6 567919.6 25 237 8808 0.857477 3247528 1497856 
-3 6 5175 0.503797 3573471 3257547 26 307 9115 0.887364 4011027 1893554 
-2 16 5191 0.505354 14743150 3230452 27 191 9306 0.905958 4060079 1580930 
-1 10 5201 0.506328 5064404 1744926 28 186 9492 0.924065 2768044 1574914 
0 27 5228 0.508956 1995484 1484319 29 170 9662 0.940615 2750080 1538195 
1 36 5264 0.512461 1996844 1844379 30 177 9839 0.957847 2594264 1748829 
2 8 5272 0.51324 1389407 963928.3 31 100 9939 0.967582 2819035 2498750 
3 24 5296 0.515576 4308017 1677450 32 66 10005 0.974007 4645314 2116167 
4 47 5343 0.520152 2351609 1119495 33 99 10104 0.983645 5974784 1991338 
5 38 5381 0.523851 1957360 877499.1 34 32 10136 0.98676 2011257 984372.3 
6 45 5426 0.528232 3152422 1222592 35 39 10175 0.990557 3019745 1361833 
7 39 5465 0.532029 5192101 1517450 36 35 10210 0.993964 2018340 1658970 
8 41 5506 0.53602 2630269 965325.8 37 7 10217 0.994646 1157894 1280619 
9 106 5612 0.54634 2381607 1005703 38 20 10237 0.996593 2113582 1439091 
10 88 5700 0.554907 2683830 1021699 39 9 10246 0.997469 6549249 4747189 
11 38 5738 0.558606 1492510 892000 40 1 10247 0.997566 784963.6 784963.6 
12 137 5875 0.571943 3622962 1455156 41 1 10248 0.997664 0 0 
13 129 6004 0.584502 3152513 1457160 42 6 10254 0.998248 3655612 1648562 
14 112 6116 0.595405 3247094 1336885 43 11 10265 0.999319 1570101 1711835 
15 195 6311 0.614389 3157381 1259599 44 2 10267 0.999513 4778296 4778296 
16 263 6574 0.639992 2701133 1381554 48 0 10267 0.999513 . . 
17 249 6823 0.664233 1979852 1322957 49 3 10270 0.999805 2569033 3556642 
18 242 7065 0.687792 3419424 1268082 55 2 10272 1 1488725 1488725 
19 273 7338 0.714369 3428776 1814553  
 
 
4.  Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper the educational backgrounds of the Highest Paid Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the Unit-
ed States are examined.  Specifically, the extent to which the specific degree earned affects the salary received and 
other variables are examined.  The data for the study is the Forbes 800 CEO compensation data.  The time period for 
this study is the thirteen years from 1987-1999.  The results indicate that the total compensation that individuals earn 
as the CEO of the firm depends upon the undergraduate and graduate degree that the individual earns. Those with 
differing degrees are found to have been with the firm for a differing number of year, earned their undergraduate and 
graduate degrees at different ages, started working for the firm at different ages, became the CEO at differing ages, 
and were with the firm for differing number of years prior to becoming the CEO.  We find that CEOs frequently 
start working for their firms prior to earning their undergraduate and graduate degrees.  However, we find that few 
CEOs earn either their undergraduate or graduate degrees after becoming the CEO of the firm. 
 
While the findings of this study are an important advancement in the literature, there are several limitations 
of the study.  First, the analysis does not control for the industry in which the firm operates.  This has been found in 
other literature to be an important explanatory variable.  Second, the analysis addresses only the total compensation 
of the CEO.  It does not decompose the nature of the compensation into its various elements.  Thirdly, the analysis 
does not decompose the data into those CEOs that are firm founders versus those that are not firm founders.  Ana-
lyzing each of the above three points would shed additional light onto the CEO compensation literature.  While the 
data is available to analyze the above issues, they are relegated to a future manuscript as a result of time and space 
limitations.   
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